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FEDERALISM

Are Municipalities Liable for Damages
and Attorney's Fees for Wrongfully Denying
a Permit for a Wireless Service Facility?
by Ralph C. Anzivino
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 237-243. © 2005 American Bar Association.

teur use only. The application proposed a 30 foot antenna structure
with a 10 foot retractable mast that
would extend 40 feet and nest at 30
feet. The city's Municipal Code
barred the construction of any
antenna taller than 40 feet absent a
minor exception permit, which
Abrams did not seek. The permit
approving the structure specified
that the maximum height of the
structure shall not exceed 40.0 feet
from grade to top of mast when in
use and that, when not in use, the
structure shall be lowered to 30-foot
nesting height. The permit expressly
prohibited commercial use.

Ralph C. Anzivino is a professor
of law at Marquette University
Law School in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. He can be reached
at ralph.anzivino@marquette.edu
or 414-288-7094.

Editor's Note: The respondent's brief
in this case was not available by
PREVIEWs deadline.

ISSUE
Are local governments subject to liability for damages and attorney's
fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1988 for ordinary land-use decisions
found to violate the
Telecommunications Act?

After receiving his permit, Abrams
submitted construction plans that
described the project as a 30 foot
tower, but depicted an antenna
structure with a fixed height of 52.5
feet. Unaware that the Planning
Department had specified a maximum height of 40 feet and a nesting
height of 30 feet, the building inspector stamped the plans as approved.

FACTS
Mark J. Abrams holds numerous
FCC licenses and provides radio
communication services for profit,
individually, and as a principal in a
company called Mobile Relay
Associates. He is also a licensed
amateur radio operator.

(Continued on Page 238)

Abrams resides in the city of
Rancho Palos Verdes. His property
and the surrounding neighborhood
are zoned for detached, single-family residences in a low-density environment. Between 1989 and 1990,
Abrams applied for and received
permission from the city's Planning
Department to erect a radio antenna
in the yard of his residence for ama-
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Thereafter, Abrams erected a 52.5foot tower. Notwithstanding the permit's prohibition on commercial use
of the antenna structure, Abrams
used it to provide commercial services. In addition, Abrams, his company, and others, acquired more
than 70 FCC licenses to operate on
commercial frequencies from
Abrams's residence.
While the city was investigating suspected commercial uses of the 52.5foot antenna tower, Abrams erected
another tower. This tower was erected on a trailer in his yard, and
extended it to a height of more than
100 feet. Abrams did not seek a permit for the new tower. Instead, he
advised the city that the tower was a
mobile antenna not covered by the
Municipal Code. Although Abrams
later lowered the tower to 75 feet,
he declined to remove or fully
retract it. The city filed an action for
declaratory and injunctive relief
against Abrams in Los Angeles
County Superior Court on April 12,
1999, alleging that both antennas
and their commercial use violated
the city's zoning laws. On September
13, 1999, the Superior Court preliminarily enjoined Abrams's unauthorized commercial use of the towers
and required him to remove the
trailer-mounted tower.
After the Superior Court issued the
injunction, Abrams applied for a
conditional use permit (CUP) to
allow him to offer commercial radio
services using the 52.5-foot antenna
tower in his yard. The staff of the
city's Planning Department prepared
a report assessing the impact of
converting the tower to commercial
use. The report recommended that
the application be denied. After
conducting two hearings and taking
written evidence, the Planning
Commission adopted a resolution
denying the application. The resolution stressed the tower's visual
prominence within the neighbor-

hood and its negative visual
impacts. The Commission found
that the commercial use of such a
visually prominent structure would
be inconsistent with the residential
purpose and character of the neighborhood, as well as the city's
Antenna Development Guidelines,
which encourage the placement of
commercial antennae in non-single
family residential areas. The
Commission found its decision consistent with each of the
Telecommunications Act's (TCA)
requirements.
Abrams appealed to the City
Council. After further public hearings, the Council adopted a resolution upholding the Planning
Commission. Like the Planning
Commission, the City Council concluded that the proposed commercial use was inconsistent with the
neighborhood's zoning, which is for
detached, single-family residences.
That designation permits "accessory" structures, i.e., structures closely linked, incidental, and subordinate to the property's use as a single-family residence. The Council
found that a commercial antenna
was neither incidental nor subordinate to the property's primary use
as a residence. The Council noted
that, when the city authorized
Abrams to build the antenna structure, he expressly agreed that it was
not to exceed 40 feet in height and
was not to be used for commercial
purposes. Notwithstanding those
conditions, the antenna structure
was constructed at a height of 52.5
feet, and Abrams used it for commercial purposes.
The Council found that the tower
and antenna array were highly visible and had adverse visual and aesthetic impacts on the surrounding
neighborhood. Because of the tower's height, configuration and proximity to surrounding lots and rightsof-way, as well as the small size of

Abrams's lot, the Council found that
the adverse visual impacts could not
be addressed except by modifying
the tower's height, location, or configuration. Abrams, however,
advised the Council that he would
not consider any alteration or
reduction of the height, size, configuration, or location of the existing
tower. Finally, the City Council
found that its decision was consistent with the TCA. In the Council's
opinion, there was no discrimination among service providers
because the denial rested on the
tower's adverse visual and aesthetic
impacts and Abrams's refusal to mitigate those effects.
Abrams then filed suit in United
States District Court for the Central
District of California, alleging that
the city violated the TCA by denying him a conditional use permit.
Abrams sought an injunction requiring the city to issue a permit allowing commercial use of the tower.
Abrams also sought damages and
attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983 and 1988, asserting that the
city had violated his rights under
the TCA. Following trial on a stipulated administrative record, the district court ruled for Abrams, holding
that the city's decision was not supported by substantial evidence as
required by the TCA. The court
entered an order vacating the city's
denial of Abrams's application,
remanded the matter to the city,
and ordered the city to grant the
application subject to reasonable
conditions. The district court
denied Abrams's request for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and his
corresponding request for attorney's
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The
court reasoned that the remedies
for the TCA violations are subsumed
within the TCA's review provisions,
and thus, damages pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 were not available.
Abrams appealed the district court's
denial of damages and fees under 42
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U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, and the
Ninth Circuit reversed. Abrams v.
City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 354
F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2004). The
Ninth Circuit concluded that the
TCA does create a right of action for
expedited judicial review of any
final state or local government decision, subject to a short statute of
limitations (30 days). But the Ninth
Circuit held that the TCA's remedial
scheme was not sufficient to close
the door on § 1983 liability because
it did not provide for any type of
relief or specify any remedies.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held
that § 1983 remedies were available
and that the district court should
award § 1983 damages. The Ninth
Circuit's decision is contrary to the
Third and Seventh Circuit decisions
on this issue. See, Nextel Partners,
Inc. v. Kingston Township, 286
F3d. 687 (3rd. Cir. 2002) and Prime
Co. PersonalCommunications L.P
v. City of Mequon, 352 F.3d. 1147
(7th. Cir. 2003). The city's writ of
certiorariwas granted on May 25,
2004. 125 S.Ct. 26 (2004).
CASE ANALYSIS
The Communications Act of 1934
(TCA) established a comprehensive
system for the regulation of communication by wire and radio. In 1996,
Congress amended the TCA to
secure lower prices and higher quality services for consumers by promoting competition, reducing regulation, and encouraging the rapid
development of telephone communication technologies. The 1996
amendments added 47 U.S.C.
§ 332(c)(7) to address the relationship between local land-use policies
and the siting, construction, and
modification of antenna towers used
to provide cellular and other wireless telephone services. Section
332(c)(7) generally establishes a balance that leaves zoning authority in
the hands of state and local governments, but subject to specified limits. Entitled "Preservation of local

zoning authority," § 332(c)(7)(A)
states in part: "Except as provided in
this paragraph, nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the authority
of a State or local government or
instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities."
Section 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B),
however, establishes certain limits
on that authority. First, it provides
that state and local regulation of the
placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service
facilities may not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent services. Second,
it declares that such regulation may
not prohibit or have the effect of
prohibiting the provision of personal
wireless services. Finally, the section bars regulation based on the
environmental effects of radio frequency emissions if the facilities
otherwise comply with FCC rules.
Within those limits, states and
municipalities retain the flexibility
to treat facilities that create different visual, aesthetic, or safety concerns differently.
Section 332(c)(7) incorporates local
administrative review of an applicant's request, followed by a right to
federal judicial review. It requires
state and local authorities to act on
requests to place, construct, or
modify wireless service facilities
within a reasonable period of time,
taking into account the nature and
scope of such request. Any decision
denying a request must be in writing and supported by substantial
evidence contained in a written
record. The TCA provides an
express federal cause of action to
enforce those requirements: Any
person adversely affected by any
final action or failure to act by a
state or local government may within 30 days after such action or failure to act, commence an action in

any court of competent jurisdiction.
The court shall hear and decide
such action on an expedited basis.
Finally, persons adversely affected
by improper consideration of the
"environmental effects of radio frequency emissions" in violation of
§ 332(c)(7)(B) have an additional
option. They may bring the cause of
action for judicial review described
above, or they may petition the FCC
for relief. The FCC handles such
requests as petitions for declaratory
judgments.
The City's Arguments
Section 1983 creates a cause of
action for the violation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and
§ 1988 entitles successful § 1983
plaintiffs to attorney's fees. The city
asserts that §§ 1983 and 1988 remedies are not available when
Congress has provided a comprehensive remedial scheme. The city
asserts that the TCA establishes a
comprehensive remedial scheme for
the enforcement of federal requirements. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that when Congress
enacts a statute that simultaneously
establishes a federal interest and
provides a tailored means for its
vindication, Congress intends
enforcement through that specific
and tailored procedure rather than
through damage actions under more
general remedial statutes such as
§ 1983. Middlesex County
Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
The city argues that in provision
after provision of the TCA, Congress
specified both the legal duty and the
appropriate governmental and private remedies. First, recognizing the
traditional importance of state and
local administrative processes,
§ 332(c) (7) provides for a local
determination. It requires state and
(Continued on Page 240)
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local governments to act on
requests for authorization to place,
construct, or modify personal wireless facilities within a reasonable
period of time; requires that any
decision to deny be in writing; and
requires that such decisions be supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.
Critically, § 332(c)(7) then provides
an express and carefully tailored
expedited judicial remedy through
which a plaintiff can redress violations of the TCA. In particular, any
person adversely affected by a state
or local government's final action or
failure to act may file an action in
any court of competent jurisdiction.
The TCA also establishes careful
conditions on such suits, requiring
that such an action be filed within a
very short period (30 days) and correspondingly requiring the court to
hear and decide such action on an
expedited basis. Further, the TCA
authorizes any person adversely
affected by a violation based on the
environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to bring an action
in court or petition the FCC for
relief. The presence of such an elaborate and detailed enforcement
regime indicates that Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate and supplanted
any remedy that otherwise would be
available under § 1983.
The city also argues that § 1983 is
not available where statutory remedies are incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983. In
the city's opinion, any enforcement
through § 1983 is clearly inconsistent with § 332(c)(7). The statutory
cause of action created requires
expedition by providing speedy
redress for violation of the TCA. It
imposes a 30-day filing period. That
deadline ensures that affected persons seek relief quickly, consistent
both with traditional zoning requirements and with Congress's intent to
avoid delays that might interfere

with the goal of rapid deployment of
new telecommunications technologies for the public benefit. The city
maintains that allowing plaintiffs to
assert TCA claims under § 1983
would upset this balance. A plaintiff
would be freed of the short 30-day
limitations period for filing suit.
Instead, a plaintiff would have four
years to commence a § 1983 action
under 28 U.S.C. § 1658. Also, allowing suit under § 1983 would free
courts of the obligation to hear the
claim on an expedited basis. The
absence of mandatory expedition
does not merely harm litigants who
must bear losses that accrue during
delay. It also harms the public interest by delaying the rapid deployment of new telecommunication
technologies that Congress sought
to promote. By imposing a 30-day
filing period and mandating expedited review under the TCA, Congress
provided a mechanism for rapid and
streamlined resolution of antennasiting decisions in the public interest. Replacing the mechanism with
a four-year limitations period and
ordinary time frames for judicial
resolution under § 1983 grossly
undermines Congress's intent.
The city also believes that imposing
§ 1983 liability and the associated
obligation to pay attorney's fees will
impose a significant financial burden on municipalities. It is
inevitable that local governments,
particularly small, rural municipalities, will sometimes stumble, albeit
in an earnest attempt to comply
with the TCA. Because municipalities do not enjoy immunity from
suit under § 1983, permitting
§ 1983 actions in this context
threatens significant liability for virtually every mistake in implementing the TCA's often-complex
requirements. The potential exposure is enormous. Each year, municipalities must address tens of thousands of applicants to construct
wireless facilities. Over the last
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decade, the number of cell towers
increased from 25,000 to 165,000.
According to the Cellular Telephone
Industry Association, more than
23,000 new cell sites were added in
2003 alone, and there is no sign the
expansion will abate. Under the
Ninth Circuit's view, each proposal
for a new or modified cell site represents a potential damages and fee
award.
Moreover, § 332(c)(7) plaintiffs are
often large corporations or affiliates,
while the defendants are often
small, rural municipalities that cannot risk significant liability. Suits
involving § 332(c)(7) typically pit
substantial corporations, such as
Verizon, against small towns with a
planning commission whose members may double as alderman.
Plaintiffs such as AT&T Wireless, a
$7 billion subsidiary of a $62 billion
multi-national corporation, are
more than happy to serve as private
attorneys general to enforce the legislative measures they have lobbied
through Congress, without the need
for taxpayers to pay their litigation
costs. Compared to the budgets of
the defendant local governments,
the fees incurred by such well-funded and determined plaintiffs can be
staggering. A single erroneous zoning decision could cost the smallest
of towns hundreds of thousands of
dollars. Surely Congress never
anticipated such a result.
Further, the threat of such awards
will seriously distort the decisionmaking process. Permitting suit
under § 1983 for claimed violations
of § 332(c)(7) would not threaten
local governments with liability for
authorizing a facility. Rather, they
would confront that risk only if they
deny authorization. Smaller communities that lack sufficient resources
to risk damages and attorney's fees
may shrink from meaningfully overseeing the placement of the oftenunsightly transmission towers that
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otherwise seem to sprout like weeds
after a summer rain. The resulting
patchwork of towers, sited with little
regard for legitimate zoning and
planning requirements, would be
wholly inconsistent with Congress's
goal of preserving state and local
authority. The routine imposition of
damages and fees thus stretches the
TCA too far.
The city also believes that the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning is incorrect. The
Ninth Circuit did not dispute that
§ 332(c)(7) provides for the invocation of local administrative procedures followed by federal judicial
review. To the contrary, it acknowledged that § 332(c)(7) expressly
provides private judicial remedies
through which a plaintiff can
redress TCA violations in federal
court. But, the Ninth Circuit held
that § 332(c)(7) is not significantly
remedial because it does not provide for any specified type of relief.
In the Ninth Circuit's opinion, the
TCA grants no remedies beyond
procedural rights. The Ninth Circuit
deemed the cause of action for
expedited judicial review to be hollow because an expedited decision
does nothing to remedy a TCA violation. The city believes that the
Ninth Circuit's assertion that §
332(c)(7) creates a federal private
cause of action, but affords successful plaintiffs no remedies at all, borders on the absurd. A statutory
cause of action that does not permit
courts to impose remedies would be
non-justifiable. Federal courts have
no authority to issue advisory opinions without relief that alters the
legal relationship of the parties.
Moreover, Congress designed the
cause of action in § 332(c)(7) to
provide a mechanism for judicial
relief.
The city admits that § 332(c)(7)
does not enumerate the available
remedies. However, federal courts
adjudicating claims under statutes

that create a cause of action, but
are silent about remedies, are presumed to have the power to award
any "appropriate" relief. In the context of judicial review of zoning disputes, the traditionally available and
thus "appropriate" relief has long
been equitable or specific relief,
such as an injunction requiring the
defendant to issue improperly withheld permits, or a remand for a new
decision that complies with legal
standards. Consistent with that tradition, every court (except for the
Ninth Circuit) that has considered
the matter has concluded that
§ 332(c)(7) authorizes injunctive
relief. Indeed, the district court
ordered precisely that relief in this
case. There is nothing "hollow"
about those traditional remedies.
They have long provided prompt
and effective review and revision of
zoning and land-use decisions. They
likewise have proved effective in the
context of the Administrative
Procedure Act, which provides similar (and potentially more limited)
specific relief from unlawful or erroneous agency decisions. Federal
courts that hear and decide cases
under § 332(c)(7) have the authority to order the issuance of the very
thing the Abrams sought in the first
instance, a permit to build the disputed antenna structure. That relief
is quick and complete.
Finally, the evolution of the text
that ultimately became § 332(c)(7)
belies the contention that Congress
intended to impose damages and fee
awards under §§ 1983 and 1988. As
originally drafted, the 1996 amendments would have vested the FCC
with total responsibility and authority to preempt state and local zoning law regarding wireless communication tower siting. Nothing in the
legislative record suggests that such
agency preemption would have
resulted in the imposition of § 1983
liability. Indeed, Congress appears
to have shifted from FCC enforce-

ment to judicial review to avoid
imposing financial burdens, such as
the cost of traveling to Washington,
D.C., to defend actions before the
FCC, on small and rural municipalities. To read the resulting statute to
require those local governments to
pay damages under § 1983 and fees
under § 1988 would impose the very
sort of financial burdens that
Congress sought to avoid.
Abrams's Arguments
Abrams maintains that to obtain
remedies pursuant to § 1983, a
plaintiff must first establish a federal "right." Once a plaintiff satisfies
the initial burden of proving he has
a federal statutory right, he creates
a rebuttable presumption that he is
entitled to § 1983 remedies. The
parties agree that the TCA clearly
grants enforceable "rights." Thus,
the only question in this case is
whether the city can rebut the presumption that Congress intended
§ 1983 remedies to be available for
TCA violations. One can rebut the
presumption in favor of § 1983
remedies if one can prove that
Congress either expressly or
impliedly foreclosed § 1983 remedies. The TCA's language provides
no support for the theory that
Congress expressly foreclosed
§ 1983. Thus, the question narrows
to whether Congress impliedly foreclosed § 1983 remedies.
Congress impliedly forecloses
§ 1983 remedies when it creates a
comprehensive enforcement scheme
that is incompatible with individual
enforcement under § 1983.
However, the mere existence of
administrative mechanisms to safeguard an individual's interests does
not sufficiently evince the requisite
congressional intent. In other
words, it is not enough that
Congress provides procedures by
which a plaintiff can enforce his
rights under a statute. The city
(Continued on Page 242)
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must prove that through the remedies Congress provided in the TCA,
it intended to close the door on
§ 1983 liability.
Abrams argues that the TCA does
not explicitly provide for any types
of remedies such as damages,
injunctions, attorney's fees, or costs.
Rather, the TCA only provides a
short statute of limitations (30
days), expedited judicial review, and
avenues through which a plaintiff
can redress TCA violations (an
action in any court of competent
jurisdiction and permissive ability
to petition the FCC). Clearly, the
TCA does not contain a comprehensive remedial scheme. The TCA
grants no remedies beyond procedural rights. Thus the procedural
provisions are insufficient to establish that the TCA contains a comprehensive remedial scheme that
closes the door on § 1983 liability.
The cases in which courts have
found that Congress implied its
intent to foreclose resort to § 1983
remedies presented remedial
schemes more comprehensive than
the TCA. In those cases, courts held
that Congress impliedly foreclosed
§ 1983 remedies because the
statutes had unusually elaborate
enforcement provisions. The
statutes permitted civil penalties, litigation costs, injunctive relief, and
suspensions or revocations. The
TCA is different from those statutes
because the TCA does not provide
for any type of relief. While one may
argue that the lack of any damages
clause in the TCA is evidence that
Congress impliedly intended to foreclose damages, a better justification
for the absence of such a remedial
provision is that Congress intended
to preserve an aggrieved plaintiffs
right to invoke § 1983 damages. An
implied preservation is consistent
with the presumption in favor of
§ 1983 remedies. Thus, since the
TCA contains no remedies at all,

one must conclude that Congress
did not intend to foreclose § 1983
remedies.
Abrams further asserts that the
TCA's provisions are not remedial in
nature. One can hardly consider the
limitations period a remedy.
Shortening the limitations period to
30 days imposes a burden on an
aggrieved plaintiff, not a benefit.
The TCA's provision allowing a
plaintiff to commence an action in
any court of competent jurisdiction
is hollow as well. The only benefit
to an aggrieved plaintiff is expedited
judicial review. However, an expedited decision does nothing to remedy a TCA violation in itself.
Significantly, a court can fully comply with all of the TCA's provisions
before it even makes a determination on liability. Thus, the TCA contains procedural, rather than remedial, provisions.
In addition, the TCA's provisions are
completely compatible with § 1983's
remedies. Congress can limit the
time in which a plaintiff can file for
relief and can require an expeditious review in any court of competent jurisdictions, without inadvertently limiting the plaintiffs remedies at the same time. If a court
were to consider the TCA's procedural provisions sufficiently comprehensive to foreclose § 1983 remedies, such logic would prevent
Congress from ever providing
statutes of limitations or other procedural provisions without also
defining specific remedies. Such a
holding would unnecessarily limit §
1983 remedies to those generic
statutes that grant a right and nothing else. No such limitation should
be grafted onto § 1983 remedies.
The TCA and § 1983 remedies are
entirely compatible.

601(c)(1) of the TCA provides that
the TCA shall not be construed to
modify, impair, or supersede federal,
state, or local law unless expressly
so provided in the Act or any
amendments. The plain language of
§ 601(c)(1) demonstrates that
Congress did not intend the TCA to
alter the operation of any federal
law unless the TCA expressly provided for such change. Section 1983
clearly falls within the parameters
of this general savings clause.
SIGNIFICANCE
The telecommunications industry is
one of the fastest growing in the
nation. As the industry grows, the
need for more antenna towers will
have to be addressed. The
Telecommunications Act places primary decision-making on the construction and placement of these
towers in the hands of the local
municipalities. Further, the
Telecommunications Act specifies
procedural safeguards that must be
complied with at the local level, and
provides the aggrieved applicant
with expedited appeal rights to the
courts for redress in the event an
applicant's request is wrongfully
denied. The TCA does not expressly
provide for the recovery of attorneys fees and damages to an applicant for a wrongful denial. The
Circuits are split on whether an
aggrieved applicant is entitled to
damages and attorneys fees pursuant to § 1983. The prevailing rule
is that if a statute has a sufficient
remedial scheme, Congress intended the remedial scheme to control
and additional remedies, such as
§ 1983, are not available to supplement the statutory scheme. The
Supreme Court must decide
whether the TCA provides a sufficient remedial scheme to preclude
§ 1983 damages.

Finally, the TCA confirms
Congress's affirmative intent to preserve § 1983 remedies. Section
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American Mobile
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